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Abstract:
The paper uses data from 347 large and medium sized Estonian enterprises. The data contains
detailed information on ownership structures, financial information and investments. We
divide the firms in the sample according to the method of privatisation and largest owner.
First, we are able to provide information on how different types of owners (foreigners,
domestic outsiders and insiders) participated in the privatisation process in different branches
and how the ownership structures have evolved. Then we use several performance measures
in evaluating the efficiency of different privatisation forms and ownership types. The
performance measures include sales and employment dynamics, investment, and profit
margins. We seek answers to the following questions:
· Does privatisation enhance performance?
· Does the form or time of privatisation have any effects on performance?
· Do different ownership structures matter for performance evaluations?
* Center for East European Studies, Copenhagen Business School.
** Estonian Institute for Future Studies, Tallinn.
21 Introduction
One of the main research topics in economics of transition has been the impact of various
methods of privatisation and various ownership structures on economic performance on
enterprises. It seems that a consensus has emerged considering these issues: Privatisation
through sales to a core owner is widely advocated over alternative privatisation methods, such
as distribution of state assets to the population by voucher schemes, or management-employee
buy-outs/give-aways. Privatisation itself has been seen as beneficial per s, primarily through
the incentive effects and possibilities of outside finance. Concerning ownership structures,
privatisation to insiders1 ha  been considered as inferior to selling shares to outside core
owners. This is because of alleged agency problems having enterprise employees as owners.
Finally, it has been expected that new enterprises with no links with former state sector would
prove to be the most dynamic part of the economy.2
This paper reviews the Estonian experience. The large data set collected by the Center for
East European Studies of Copenhagen Business School, with the help of Estonian Institute on
Future Studies, on Estonian firms gives a possibility to evaluate a large host of these issues
mentioned above. This particular study was undertaken by the commission of Estonian
Privatisation Agency and is related to a book project of the agency (Terk 1999). A description
of the data and some descriptive analysis appears in Mygind (1997), and some more rigorous
analysis concerning the performance effects of privatisation is in Jones and Mygind (2000).
This paper brings some more elements to the analysis, as the division of firms between
different methods of privatisation. Due to the fact that the analysis of the data is still in
process, and because the above mentioned book is targeted to a larger audience than
professional economists, the data analysis here is descriptive. Therefore, the results must be
regarded as preliminary. However, we believe that even this approach reveals a lot of
interesting information on the Estonian privatisation experience.
So far there has been a shortage of evidence on the post-privatisation performance of Estonian
enterprises. The evidence from other data than the one used here points out that the foreign
owned enterprises have advantage over domestic owned firms (Varblane and Reiljan1999,
Purju and Teder 1999), though Terk and Pihlak (1996) did not find pronounced differences
between firms belonging to foreign or domestic outsider ownership, whereas they found that
firms belonging to insiders had worse performance. Interestingly, neither Purju and Teder nor
Terk and Pihlak found much evidence that privatisation would lead to performance
improvements in the short term. These studies have used a substantially smaller sample than
the present survey, and have not included such broad categories of privatisation methods and
ownership structures than this one.
2 Data description
The initial sample of firms contains 666 enterprises. The financial data has been obtained
from the Estonian statistical office, and the ownership data has been obtained by using
specially designed surveys. The first financial data is from the balance sheets and income
statement from the year 1993, and the first ownership data is from the first of January 1995.
Questions on the ownership structure at the moment of privatisation were also included.
Thereafter data has been collected annually from these firms. For this analysis, 347
                                                 
1 With the term insiders is referred to enterprise managers and employees, whereas outsiders refers to owners
who are not in employment relationship with the company.
2  There is a large literature on these issues. On the theoretical premises on the effect of privatisation and
ownership structures, see e.g. Estrin (1994), The World Bank (1996), Boycko et.al. (1996), EBRD (1997); on
some empirical analysis, see Earle et. al. (1996), Frydman et.al. (1997) and Jones (1998).
3enterprises were selected, the selection criteria being that the firms should have at least 50
employees either in 1993 or in 1996.3
Since the data has been obtained directly from the Estonian statistical office, the response
rates of the sample are extremely high. By looking at the responses in tables, one can however
note that the number of responses drops sharply in 1996 and especially in 1997. This is
however probably more due to the fact that many enterprises have disappeared through
liquidations, mergers and bankruptcies. We are not always able to distinguish when the firm
does not exist any more and when it does not provide information. Especially problematic is
the investment data, which the statistical office does not collect from all enterprises. The
investment data covers each year around 50-60 per cent of the enterprises in the sample, but
these enterprises are not necessarily the same from year to year.
We use several methods in classifying the firms (see also Table 1). First, they are classified
into six different branches. The branch categorisation relies upon the classification of the
Estonian statistical office, which has classified the firms in 8 major groups, and three of these
has been collapsed into one (industry). Secondly, they are classified into six categories
according to the privatisation forms: state-owned, early privatised (which includes all firms
privatised up to 1993, that year including), later privatised (after 1993), new private start-ups,
former co-operatives, and joint ventures. There were two types of co-operatives in Estonia
during Soviet period: First, the “old” co-operatives. These include collective farms from
earlier periods which often had auxiliary units operating in other branches than agriculture,
and the consumer co-operatives. Secondly, there are co-operatives established in late 1980s,
which were kind of quasi-private structures outside the control of branch ministries.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to distinguish the latter group from the new firms, so latter
type co-operatives are simply under the newly established firms. Both types of former co-
operatives usually transformed into joint-stock companies when this became possible. Joint
ventures, in turn, originate from the late 1980s. They were established in co-operation with
Estonian state and a foreign partner so that the Estonian state kept the majority control. Co-
operatives and joint ventures are different from the more traditional types of state-owned
firms in the sense that they were quasi-private structures. In privatisation process, they were
privatised separately from other state-owned firms.
Until 1993 privatisation of former state-owned enterprises focused more on small- and
medium-sized enterprises. From 1993 onwards, when the Estonian privatisation agency was
established, the privatisation proceeded in a more systematic way, and focused on
privatisation by sales to core investors. The privatisation strategy after 1993 was mainly based
on sales to core investors. The bulk of the enterprises were privatised in one-and-half years
after the establishment of the Privatisation Agency, so the Estonian case might be called as
mass privatisation through sales.4 The privatisation of large-scale enterprises has been mainly
implemented after summer 1993, that is after Estonia amended its privatisation laws. This
provides a rationale for dividing the former state owned enterprises into later and early
privatised. It should also be noted that private start-ups are much underrepresented in the
sample compared to their number in the total population of Estonian enterprises. This is
because of the applied size criterion.
                                                 
3  The reasons for this were that at the limits of the subproject, we were interested mainly in larger firms, and
because of some time constraints, it would not have been possible to get some additional information in short
time from all firms.
4 Vouchers were also used in privatisation process, but vouchers were usually used after there was already a
majority owner for the firm.
4A third type of classification is the division of the data according to the owners. Strong claims
have been made in the transition literature that certain types of ownership, as foreign owners
and strategic owners would be superior compared to diffused domestic owners, or to
enterprise managers or employees. There are extremely few examples from Estonia where
majority of shares were dispersed to a larger group of distant owners, but cases where the
enterprise insiders obtained the majority of shares were more typical. The classification we
use here is foreigners, Estonian enterprises, Estonian individuals5, managers, employees and
state  (actually, both state and municipal enterprises are included in this category). The firm is
classified as being owned by a certain group when this group is the largest shareowner; thus,
majority ownership is not required.
As already noted, some forms of private ownership had been created already at the end of
1980s, but privatisation really gained its momentum in the beginning of the 1990s, alongside
with large societal changes. The first wave of privatisation, during which small-scale
privatisation was completed and large-scale privatisation started by experimental basis, lasted
until 1993, when the Estonian Privatisation Agency was established.  In the first phase of
privatisation, the most important group of participants in the initial phase of privatisation was
the enterprise employees (Table 2). Enterprise employees got some preferable treatment in
small scale privatisation, but in large scale privatisation they had only few advantages
compared with other investors (Terk, 1996). Given our size criteria, which excludes most
small-scale enterprises, the magnitude of employee participation in earlier phase of
privatisation may be surprising. After 1993, when privatisation became more controlled, sales
to employees has been unusual, and most of the enterprises were privatised to Estonian
enterprises. The participation of foreign enterprises in privatisation process, even though it
has gained a considerable publicity, is quite modest in our sample. In contrast, foreigners are
the largest group of owners in the new start-ups group of the sample. Estonian enterprises
seem to be especially well represented in the group of former co-operatives, but this might be
partly due to misclassification. Our data might in fact underestimate the presence of insider
ownership, since in some cases insiders have established a company which took over the
assets of privatised firm, and these cases may in our data show up as outsider owned firms.
3 Observations by sectors
Table 3 gives an overview how different privatisation methods have been used in different
branches. Both in early and late privatisation there have been firms from all branches, though
in later privatisation firms in industry have been over-represented. On the contrary, joint
ventures have been established almost exclusively in industry and trade. Some other
observations can be made, like that the former co-operatives are over-represented in
agriculture, and that new start-ups are most common in construction, trade and services.
In table 4, we may compare the ownership structure of sectors at two different points of time.
Notably, when the state in 1994 owned 12 agricultural enterprises in our sample (or 40% of
agricultural enterprises in the sample), in 1997 there was no state owned agricultural firms
left. This reflects the fact that the old state farms have been either privatised or more
commonly, liquidated. And while the state was in 1994 still the largest owner in industry, by
1997 its ownership in industrial enterprises is almost vanished. Transport and services seem to
                                                 
5 The distinction between Estonian enterprises and Estonian individuals is based upon the manager survey: the
manager is asked to distinguish the owners between enterprises and individuals. There might, however, be some
problems in this classification, because private individuals often established a company for the purpose to
purchase the assets of a firm in the privatisation process.  Therefore, this distinction may not always be reliable.
On the other hand, we did not give it up because there are some clear differences among the firms where the
owner is classified as being an enterprise or an individual.
5be the two areas where state ownership still prevails. Foreign ownership is zero in agricultural
enterprises and quite small in other sectors too, but large in industry. There is proportionally
less manager- and employee-controlled firms in industry.
We do not attempt in the following analysis to control for variations among different
branches, but some words of the comparable performance, as they appear in the data, are in
order. The sectors which do in each year better than average or about the average in terms of
sales dynamics are industry, transport and construction, whereas the performance of the trade
sector is for each year below the average, and so is agriculture, except in 1997. Roughly the
same patterns characterise the employment dynamics.
4 Performance differences between privatisation forms
Tables 5 and 6 give the median and mean values of sales, employment and fixed assets,
divided by the privatisation groups, for the years 1994 and 1997. As expected, the later
privatised firms, especially firms privatised in 1996 and 1997, are considerably larger than
firms privatised earlier. It is also somewhat surprising that the median and mean values of
sales and fixed assets are about the same between early privatised firms and new private start-
ups, whereas the employment in start-ups is considerably lower. The largest firms by sales
and especially by fixed assets are joint ventures. It might also be noted that firms privatised in
1997 and firms which were still not privatised in the end of 1997 have a skewed structure:
means are much larger than median, because there is a mixture of very large and small firms.
In the following, we present the analysis on how firms with different privatisation forms have
performed. We attempted to use measures that would be simple to interpret and not biased.
For instance, using mean values in sales or employment dynamics may be problematic: Using
the growth averages of groups, the impact of large firms is going to be pronounced, which is
especially problematic when the group sizes are small. Alternative approach to take the
average of individual growth rates inside the group is equally problematic, since in the
turbulent transition growth rates might be extreme, again biasing the results. The simple
approach taken here is to count the percentage of firms that increased sales (or employment)
in a given year. The sales for each year, as all the other monetary variables, were transformed
into real growth by using the producer price indices, taken from the EBRD (1998) transition
report.
As can be seen from Table 7, it is quite impossible to draw strong conclusion on the sales
performance of different groups. Perhaps the most interesting aspect is that a considerable
amount of firms are able to increase sales in the year they are privatised, though this does not
apply for the year 1997. In the year following privatisation the proportion of firms increasing
sales is already less for each year than in the year of privatisation, though higher than in the
year before privatisation. Thus, privatisation might boost sale performance but the impact is
not necessarily very strong. Also, it might be that the firms prior to privatisation deliberately
deteriorate the performance in order to buy the firm for lower prices, especially if insiders are
the buyers.
The growth dynamics of sales of state owned enterprises show also an interesting pattern. The
number of firms in state ownership, which are able to increase sales, rises quite dramatically
from year to year. In the year 1997, the performance of state firms is comparable to that of
private firms. Part of the increase in the performance of state firms is because the liquidation
of unviable firms. However, the performance is enhanced not only because of liquidation, but
also in the group of firms which are still state owned in the end of 1997 there has been
remarkable progress. This poses a question of how much there is potential endogeneity in the
6results concerning state ownership: Do the firms that expect to become privatised have
incentives to deteriorate performance, whereas enterprises which do not expect to be
privatised have incentives to increase performance? Unfortunately, at this point we may only
speculate with these issues.
The employment dynamics (Table 8) suggest that new private firms may be more prone to
increase employment than other type of private and state firms. This is quite natural given that
they are not likely to suffer from excess labour as are the old state firms. The sales per
employees figures are also higher for new start-ups than they are for other types of private
firms, except for joint ventures, which have the highest sales/employees ratio (Table 10).
It is perhaps surprising to compare the overall development of sales and employment. Overall,
the growth rate of sales in fixed prices has been higher than the growth of employment in the
period of 1994-97. Moreover, sales increased strongly in the year 1997 whereas the
percentage of firms increasing employment was lowest that year. This is also evident from
Table 9, which shows that sales per employees have grown strongly in Estonian enterprises in
1997. It is however possible that our sample gives a too dismal picture on employment
development (and perhaps on sales as well), because the smallest firms are not represented in
the sample, neither are firms which have been established after 1993.
The data on investment is actually not as good as other data, since the statistical office has not
collected investment data on all firms on the sample. Therefore, one should take the
investment figures of Table 11 with some caution (and check the number of observations). In
that table, investment is proportional to the number of employees (log of investment in kroons
per employee). The results seem to vary from year to year quite much, perhaps because there
are different firms in different years, but it appears quite safe to say that joint ventures have
higher investment levels than other type of firms.
The last indicator we used was profitability. We used as an indicator of profitability the ratio
of net revenues to total expenses. Then we divided the firms in three equally large groups
according to their ranking of profitability. For space reasons, we present only the results of
the high profitability group (Table 12). If more than 33,3 per cent of firms in a certain group
belongs to the high profitability group, then it means that among these firms there are more
highly profitable enterprises than in the sample in average.6 Ag in, there is quite much
variability, and difficult to make strong conclusions. What may be of interest is that the most
profitable firms for each year are those that were privatised in 1994, even in the year when
they were still state owned!
5 Differences by dominating owner
Finally, we try to shed some light on the relative performance of different ownership groups,
using categorisations outlined above. Since the performance of the state sector was reviewed
in the previous section, we concentrate here only on the private sector performance. Table 13a
shows the ownership structures in the end of 1994 and in the end of 1997. The most frequent
changes are away from state ownership, as a consequence of privatisation. The other category
with falling frequency is employee-owned firms. Moreover, table 13b reveals that the changes
away from employee ownership mainly happen in the group of early privatised enterprises. It
seems likely that in many cases employee ownership has been window-dressing for a
                                                 
6 Highly profitable in this context means only that the firms belong to the best third. In practice, this means that
net revenues were about 5-6% higher than total expenses, whereas for around a third of enterprises for each year
expenses were higher than revenues. The sales/expenses ratio tended to fall somewhat in latest years.
7management take-over.7 Another group, which takes over employee-owned firms are
Estonian individuals, but we suspect that many of these “outsiders“ are in fact former
employees. A practical implication of this for the reader is that in the following tables the
groups do not consist always of same enterprises. For instance, the growth dynamics of 1994
for employee owned companies refer to companies which were employee owned in the end of
1994, the dynamics of 1995 refer to companies which were employee owned in the end of
1995, and so on. It would be potentially interesting and important to control for the impact of
changes in ownership, but we have not attempted to do that here.8
Another interesting aspect from Table 13 concerns the survival of the enterprises. First of all,
a high proportion of state owned firms have been liquidated. More than a quarter of the firms,
which were state owned in 1994, has been liquidated by the end of 1997. Perhaps more
interesting however is that a smaller proportion of firms owned by insiders and individuals are
liquidated during that period than firms owned by foreigners or other enterprises. Especially
manager owned firms survived better.
Table 14 on the dynamics of sales under different owner shows again that there is a
considerable variety between groups in different years. The group of foreign owners does
each year better than average, and the group of Estonian individual owners do every year
worse than average. Considering employment (Table 15), the differences are more
pronounced: Foreign firms are clearly better than domestic firms in creating employment. The
differences are even larger when joint ventures are excluded (except for the year 1997, when
joint ventures did actually better than foreign owned firms in average). And despite the fact
that foreign firms seem to be more prone to hire new employees, the sales per employees and
investment per employees are at much higher level in these firms. Among domestic owners, it
is more difficult to make any kind of strong conclusions. Employee-owned firms seem to
have somewhat lower sales per employees and investment averages.
The surprise may be the profitability measures. For every year, except 1995, the insider
owned firms are doing better in terms of profitability than outsider owned firms. The share of
profitable insider owned companies seems, if anything, being increased over time. One would
perhaps expect the higher investment ratios of foreign owned firms to show up as improved
profitability over time, but so far there is not much evidence on that.
6 Differences in performance between dominating owners in different forms of
privatisation
The last piece of evidence considers the relative performance of different owners divided by
privatisation forms. For space limitations, the results are not referred in tables, but are briefly
reviewed here.
After firms have been divided into smaller groups, the group sizes get quite small, which is
likely to be the reason for the great variability of the performance from year to year.
Concerning sales and employment, the best group of firms in early privatised firms is clearly
foreign enterprises. It also seems that the early privatised foreign owned firms are the best of
foreign firms in Estonia, since in other groups (later privatised and new private) it is not easy
to say whether foreign owned firms are doing remarkably better than domestic firms. Foreign
owned firms have higher level of sales per employees and investment per employees in all
groups, except for investment in new private firms.
                                                 
7 Terk (1996) explains that in earlier stages of privatisation, the politicians and public opinion were somewhat
more favourable to plans to privatise if the new owners represented a larger interest group than managers alone.
8Actually, Jones and Mygind (1999) found with the same data that ownership changes affect results.
8Another interesting observation seems to be that among insider owned firms, the most
successful are those that are former co-operatives. The rates of growth of sales and
employment are higher for insider owned firms in this group than for insider owned
companies in other groups, though the level of sales per employees or investment per
employees are not particularly high.
Concerning profitability, it appears that insider dominated firms are the most profitable in all
groups. This is especially true among new private firms, where foreign and outsider owned
firms are not very profitable. In contrast, foreign firms do not fare well in profitability
comparisons, with the exception of early privatised foreign firms.9
7 Conclusions
Because of the absence of various controls, the results of the analysis should be regarded as
preliminary. However, they seem to be broadly in line with the more advanced approach used
by Jones and Mygind (2000). Thus, the support for the claim that privatisation improves
performance at the firm level receives only modest support. The performance indicators we
use are sometimes better after privatisation than before privatisation, but not always. Given
the development of economic performance of state owned enterprises, we do neither find
evidence for the hypothesis that state ownership would necessarily lead to inferior
performance. We should however be aware of some selection biases. It is suggested that
immediately following the establishment of privatisation agency, such enterprises were
privatised for which it was easy to find buyers (i.e. better firms), in 1996-1997 somewhat
inferior firms were privatised, and the firms still in state ownership or part of them may be
“crown jewels”. The data gives support for these claims. Thus, the remaining state firms do
not form an ideal control group. Secondly, even if we accept the conclusion that the
performance of state firms is not different than those of private firms, it does not mean that
privatisation, as a fundamental change affecting the economic system, would not matter.
Instead, the good performance of the state firms may result from enhanced incentives to
operate in a market-based system.
On the ownership groups, we find some support to the claim that foreign ownership brings
beneficial effects, especially considering employment creation, investment and sales per
employees. Despite these advantages, very few enterprises in our sample attract after
privatisation foreign capital. Also, we fail to find much evidence on the inferiority of insider
owned firms, though it seems that sales per employees and investment per employees are
especially in employee owned firms in a lower level than the average. On the contrary, it
seems that insider owned firms have a higher propensity to survive and have higher profits
than other types of firms.                         
                                                 
9  Possibly transfer pricing could be an explanation to this.
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TABLE 1. BRANCH, PRIVATISATION AND OWNERSHIP CLASSES USED
Branch:
1. Agriculture and fishing
2. Industry (manufacturing, wood, mining etc.)
3. Construction
4. Trade
5. Transport
6. Services
Privatisation:
1. Early privatised (-1993) (EP)
2. New start-ups (NS)
3. Former cooperatives (FC)
4. Joint ventures (JV)
5. Later privatised (1994) (LP94)
6. Later privatised (1995)(LP95)
7. Later privatised (1996)(LP96)
8. Later privatised (1997)(LP97)
9. All late privatised (ALP)
10. State owned in the end  of 1997 (SO97)
11. State owned (SO)
Ownership:
1. Foreign(For)
2. Estonian enterprises(Ent)
3. Managers(Man)
4. Employees(Emp)
5. Estonian individuals(Ind)
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TABLE 2.
PRIVATISATION IN ESTONIA, ACCORDING TO THE YEAR, INITIAL LARGEST OWNER,
AND PRIVATISATION GROUP
PRIVATISATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
year/ownerforeign Estonian managersemployeesEstonian n.a. total
enterprise individuals
1989 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
1990 0 2 4 1 3 0 10
1991 1 1 4 18 2 0 26
1992 4 5 3 4 1 0 17
1993 4 9 4 10 1 0 28
1994 1 3 2 4 2 0 12
1995 5 22 7 1 2 0 37
1996 2 7 2 0 1 0 12
1997 1 7 1 1 0 3 13
Total 18 57 27 40 12 3 157
OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE START-UPS
year/ownerforeign Estonian managersemployeesEstonian Total
enterprise individuals
1989 0 2 0 0 0 2
1990 2 2 1 2 2 9
1991 5 0 7 3 2 17
1992 7 3 5 5 1 21
1993 2 0 0 0 0 2
Total 16 7 13 10 5 51
OWNERSHIP OF FORMER COOPERATIVES
year/ownerforeign Estonian managersemployeesEstonian Total
enterprise individuals
1988 0 0 2 0 0 2
1989 0 1 0 0 0 1
1990 0 4 0 1 0 5
1991 0 4 0 3 1 8
1992 0 10 0 3 5 18
1993 0 7 3 1 4 15
1994 0 4 0 1 1 6
Total 0 30 5 9 11 55
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OWNERSHIP OF JOINT VENTURES
foreign Estonian enterprise Total
1989 1 0 1
1990 1 0 1
1991 1 1 2
1992 3 1 4
1993 2 0 2
1994 3 0 3
1995 2 0 2
1996 1 0 1
Total 14 2 16
Note: The privatisation year refers to the year when the firm became majority owned
by private entities.
TABLE 3. THE USE OF DIFFERENT PRIVATISATION METHODS ACCORDING TO BRANCHES
EP NS FC JV LP Total
Agriculture 3 3 11 0 5 22
3,6% 5,9% 20,0% 0,0% 6,8% 7,9%
Industry 49 24 23 12 50 158
59,0% 47,1% 41,8% 70,6% 67,6% 56,4%
Construction 7 6 2 0 5 20
8,4% 11,8% 3,6% 0,0% 6,8% 7,1%
Trade 10 10 9 4 7 40
12,1% 19,6% 16,4% 23,5% 9,5% 14,3%
Transport 8 3 5 1 4 21
9,6% 5,9% 9,1% 5,9% 5,4% 7,5%
Service 6 5 5 0 3 19
7,2% 9,8% 9,1% 0,0% 4,1% 6,8%
Total 83 51 55 17 74 280
Note: The percentage implies how many firms in a privatisation groups works in given branch.
For instance, 3,6% of all early privatised firms are in agriculture, which is lower than
the
percentage of agricultural firms among all privatised firms.
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TABLE 4a. Largest owners in the end of 1994 in different branches
SO FOR ENT MAN EMP IND Total
Agriculture 12 0 4 3 5 6 30
9,0% 0,0% 6,2% 7,5% 12,2% 18,8% 8,7%
Industry 65 23 39 17 18 16 178
48,9% 63,9% 60,0% 42,5% 43,9% 50,0% 51,3%
Construction 15 3 3 3 6 1 31
11,3% 8,3% 4,6% 7,5% 14,6% 3,1% 8,9%
Trade 18 8 6 8 4 7 51
13,5% 22,2% 9,2% 20,0% 9,8% 21,9% 14,7%
Transport 13 1 7 4 4 1 30
9,8% 2,8% 10,8% 10,0% 9,8% 3,1% 8,7%
Service 10 1 6 5 4 1 27
7,5% 2,8% 9,2% 12,5% 9,8% 3,1% 7,8%
Total 133 36 65 40 41 32 347
Note: The percentage implies how many firms of a given owner type are
represented
 in given branch.
TABLE 4B Largest owners in the end of 1997 in different branches
(Note: The percentage implies how many firms of given owner type are represented in given branch)
SO FOR ENT MAN EMP IND liquidatedno data Total
Agriculture 0 0 5 4 3 4 12 2 30
0,0% 0,0% 6,6% 8,2% 13,6% 12,9% 19,7% 5,4% 8,5%
Industry 7 29 52 22 10 16 24 18 178
21,9% 74,4% 68,4% 44,9% 45,5% 51,6% 39,3% 48,7% 51,3%
Construction 5 2 3 8 2 2 8 1 31
15,6% 5,1% 4,0% 16,3% 9,1% 6,5% 13,1% 2,7% 8,9%
Trade 5 4 5 6 3 4 11 13 51
15,6% 10,3% 6,6% 12,2% 13,6% 12,9% 18,0% 35,1% 14,5%
Transport 9 2 6 5 2 2 3 1 30
28,1% 5,1% 7,9% 10,2% 9,1% 6,5% 4,9% 2,7% 8,7%
Service 6 2 5 4 2 3 3 2 27
18,8% 5,1% 6,6% 8,2% 9,1% 9,7% 4,9% 5,4% 7,8%
Total 32 39 76 49 22 31 61 37 347
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Table 5. MEAN AND MEDIAN VALUES OF SALES, EMPLOYMENT AND FIXED ASSETS
IN 1994, BY PRIVATISATION FORM
N 1994, Sales 94,Sales 94,N 1994, Empl. 94 Empl. 94,N 1994, Fixa 94, Fixa 94,
sales mean Median empl. mean median Fixa mean median
EP 83 16247 6997 83 186 112 81 4139 1331
NS 51 17212 9166 51 105 67 49 4223 1157
FC 54 17451 7548 54 171 103 54 5919 2984
JV 17 67465 35037 17 219 179 17 65046 30879
LP94 12 15130 11374 12 147 109 11 2415 2006
LP95 37 20769 9198 36 242 138 37 6144 3392
LP96 12 35986 48930 12 452 334 12 6639 4928
LP97 13 85920 24014 13 488 169 13 19949 1609
ALP 74 33768 11292 73 305 163 73 8122 2161
Not priv.* 66 49778 5632 65 398 85 64 32036 1338
All 345 29275 8191 343 239 103 338 13641 1780
Table 6. MEAN AND MEDIAN VALUES OF SALES, EMPLOYMENT AND FIXED ASSETS
IN 1997, BY PRIVATISATION FORM
N 1997, Sales 97,Sales 97,N 1997, Empl. 97 Empl. 97,Fixa 97,
N
FIXA97, Fixa97,
sales mean Median empl. mean median mean median
EP 66 16706 6828 68 129 81 70 11697 2653
NS 47 15435 5106 45 74 69 48 8791 2875
FC 49 23137 8032 50 132 76 51 16304 5880
JV 16 66301 20907 17 156 93 17 111277 32093
ALP 68 35836 9359 68 254 122 68 21005 6133
SO 25 89964 10241 26 510 96 26 109527 5137
All 274 31948 8215 281 189 82 289 29275 4683
Note: Sales and fixed assets (FIXA) have been deflated to 1994 figures using producer
price indexes from EBRD transition report (1997) and
Estonian statistical yearbook 1998 for 1997 figures.
N=Number of observations.
*Not privatised refers to companies which were never privatised, including firms which were
state-owned in the end of 1997 and state-owned firms which were later liquidated.
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TABLE 7.
Percentage of firms which increased sales by privatisation
form
1994 1995 1996 1997
EP 59,8N=82 34,2N=76 37N=73 60,6N=66
NS 70,6N=51 38,8N=49 41,7N=48 50N=46
FC 51,9N=54 42,6N=47 37N=46 57,5N=47
JV 47,1N=17 28,6N=14 35,7N=14 73,3N=15
LP94 75N=12 66,7N=12 54,5N=11 45,5N=11
LP95 21,6N=37 51,4N=37 37,1N=35 62,9N=35
LP96 16,7N=12 16,7N=12 60N=10 44,4N=9
LP97 38,5N=13 33,3N=12 45,5N=11 8,3N=12
ALP 75N=12 55,1N=49 44,6N=56 47,8N=67
SO97 37,5N=32 50N=28 51,9N=27 59,3N=27
SO 24,2N=128 38,8N=67 43,5N=46 59,3N=27
Total 46,8N=344 40,4N=302 40,3N=283 55,6N=268
Note: All late privatised refers to firms, which were privatised after 1993 and which
 Were private in the given year. State owned refers to firms which were state owned
 in the given year.
Note: Sales and fixed assets (FIXA) have been deflated to 1994 figures using
Producer price indexes from EBRD transition report
(1997) and Estonian statistical yearbook 1998 for
1997 figures.
TABLE 8.
Percentage of firms which increased employment by privatisation form
1994 1995 1996 1997
EP 34,9N=83 28,6N=77 29,7N=74 23,5N=68
NS 64,7N=51 49N=49 46,9N=49 33,3N=45
FC 35,2N=54 28,6N=49 44,7N=47 22,9N=48
JV 35,3N=17 21,4N=14 28,6N=14 43,8N=16
LP94 41,7N=12 36,4N=11 60N=10 27,3N=11
LP95 5,6N=36 38,9N=36 42,9N=35 45,7N=35
LP96 16,7N=12 8,3N=12 9,1N=11 11,1N=9
LP97 7,7N=13 33,3N=12 18,2N=11 25N=12
ALP 41,7N=12 38,3N=47 39,3N=56 34,3N=67
SO97 25,8N=31 36,7N=30 31N=28 25N=32
SO 13,6N=125 24,7N=73 26,5N=49 25N=32
Total 31,9N=342 32N=309 36,3N=289 29N=276
Note: All late privatised refers to firms, which were privatised after 1993 and which
were private in the given year. State owned refers to firms which were state owned
 in the given year.
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TABLE 9.
Percentage of firms which increased sales per employees by privatisation form
1994 1995 1996 1997
EP 64,6N=82 43,4N=76 42,5N=73 80,3N=66
NS 52,9N=51 44,9N=49 33,3N=48 68,2N=44
FC 75,9N=54 57,5N=47 45,7N=46 80,4N=46
JV 47,1N=17 28,6N=14 42,9N=14 73,3N=15
LP94 75N=12 63,6N=11 30N=10 72,7N=11
LP95 55,6N=36 52,8N=36 51,4N=35 71,4N=35
LP96 41,7N=12 33,3N=12 80N=10 66,7N=9
LP97 69,2N=13 33,3N=12 45,5N=11 33,3N=12
ALP 75N=12 55,3N=47 52,7N=55 64,2N=67
SO97 51,6N=31 64,3N=28 63N=27 77,8N=27
SO 54,8N=124 47,8N=67 34,8N=46 77,8N=27
Total 60,6N=340 48N=144 42,2N=42,2 73,6N=265
Note: All late privatised refers to firms, which were privatised after 1993 and which
were private in the given year. State owned refers to firms which were state owned
in the given year.
Note: Sales and fixed assets (FIXA) have been deflated to 1994 figures using
producer price indexes from EBRD transition report
(1997) and Estonian statistical yearbook 1998 for
1997 figures.
TABLE 10.
Level of sales per employee, average (log)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
EP 3,94N=82 4,19N=83 4,14N=76 4,04N=75 4,44N=66
NS 4,54N=51 4,65N=51 4,58N=49 4,42N=48 4,63N=44
FC 3,92N=55 4,23N=54 4,38N=47 4,3N=50 4,34N=48
JV 4,99N=17 4,83N=17 5,24N=14 5,08N=16 4,87N=16
ALP 4,21N=12 4,09N=48 4,21N=56 4,32N=68
SO 4,1N=140 4,17N=125 4,27N=67 4,44N=48 4,76N=28
All 4,14N=345 4,29N=342 4,32N=301 4,3N=293 4,48N=270
Note: The figures are logarithms of the ratio [Sales (in 1000 EEKs) /number of employees].
17
TABLE 11.
Level of investment per employee (log), privatisation form averages
1993 1994 1995 1996
EP 7,67N=50 7,87N=47 8,03N=54 8,21N=36
NS 8,83N=23 8,32N=21 8,08N=36 7,92N=27
FC 7,43N=38 7,69N=27 8,03N=34 7,75N=30
JV 9,9N=9 10,21N=8 9,95N=11 8,89N=9
ALP 8,24N=8 8,36N=44 8,08N=33
SO 7,44N=97 7,05N=89 7,47N=52 8,48N=27
All 7,74N=217 7,64N=200 8,07N=231 8,13N=162
Note: The figures are logarithms of the ratio [Sales (in EEKs) /number of
employees].
The value of investments has been deflated to 1994 using producer price index.
TABLE 12.
Percentage of firms belonging to the highest profit group, by privatisation
form.
1993N,93 1994N,94 1995N,95 1996N,96 97N,97
EP 39N=82 39,8N=83 39,5N=76 45,3N=75 31,8N=66
NS 31,4N=51 31,4N=51 28,6N=49 31,3N=48 38,3N=47
FC 36,4N=55 42,6N=54 40,4N=47 28N=50 38,8N=49
JV 35,3N=17 35,3N=17 35,7N=14 31,3N=16 37,5N=16
LP94 58,3N=12 58,3N=12 58,3N=12 45,5N=11 45,5N=11
LP95 29,7N=37 29,7N=37 37,8N=37 31,4N=35 28,6N=35
LP96 25N=12 25N=12 16,7N=12 30N=10 33,3N=9
LP97 23,1N=13 23,1N=13 16,7N=12 8,3N=12 15,4N=13
ALP 58,3N=12 42,9N=49 33,9N=56 29,4N=68
SO97 31,3N=32 31,3N=32 17,9N=14 33,3N=27 28,6N=28
SO 29,8N=141 23,4N=128 17,9N=67 22,9N=48 28,6N=28
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TABLE 13a. OWNERSHIP CHANGES BETWEEN END OF 1994/END OF 1997.
OWNERSHIP 1994/OWNERSHIP 1997
SO 97 FOR 97 ENT97 MAN97 EMP97 IND97 n.a. 97 liq. 97 Total 94
State 94 32 12 33 7 1 1 11 36 133
Foreign 94 0 24 2 2 1 0 2 5 36
Est. enterprise
94
0 1 32 2 2 1 14 13 65
Managers 94 0 0 4 28 2 3 2 1 40
Employees 94 0 1 4 8 13 7 4 4 41
Individuals 94 0 1 1 2 3 19 4 2 32
Total 97 32 39 76 49 22 31 37 61 347
Table 13b. OWNERSHIP CHANGES IN EARLY PRIVATISED ENTERPRISES
OWNERSHIP 1994/OWNERSHIP 1997
FOR 97 ENT97 MAN97 EMP97 IND97 n.a. 97 liq. 97 Total 94
Foreign 94 6 0 0 0 0 0 2 8
Est. enterprise 94 0 13 0 0 0 3 5 21
Managers 94 0 1 12 0 0 0 1 14
Employees 94 0 1 7 7 4 4 3 26
Est. individuals 94 0 1 1 0 9 1 2 14
Total 97 6 16 20 7 13 8 13 83
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PERFORMANCE OF ENTERPRISES BY OWNERSHIP GROUPS.
TABLE 14.
Percentage of firms which increased sales, by ownership
groups.
1994 1995 1996 1997
Foreign 72,2N=36 44,7N=38 45N=40 67,6N=37
ENT 58,5N=65 37,8N=74 45,1N=71 63,9N=72
MAN 61,5N=39 52,8N=53 39,6N=53 52,1N=48
EMP 65N=40 30,6N=36 43,5N=23 59,1N=22
IND 50N=32 36,7N=30 31N=29 51,6N=31
Foreign2* 80N=25 50N=28 46,7N=30 64N=25
Total 61,3N=212 41N=234 41,7N=216 59,5N=210
*Group foreign 2 excludes joint ventures.
TABLE 15.
Percentage of firms which increased employment, by ownership groups.
1994 1995 1996 1997
Foreign 58,3N=36 55,2N=38 47,5N=40 37,8N=37
ENT 36,9N=65 29,7N=74 34,3N=73 31,9N=72
MAN 53,8N=39 34,6N=52 43,4N=53 29,2N=48
EMP 39N=41 33,3N=36 30,4N=23 22,7N=22
IND 31,3N=32 23,3N=30 34,5N=29 25,8N=31
Foreign2* 68N=25 64,3N=28 53,3N=30 36N=25
Total 43,2N=213 34,5N=235 38,5N=218 30,5N=210
*Group foreign 2 excludes joint ventures.
TABLE 16.
Averages of sales per employees by ownership groups, (logs)
1994 1995 1996 1997
Foreign 5,21N=36 5,19N=38 4,95N=41 5,17N=38
ENT 4,31N=65 4,3N=73 4,42N=72 4,59N=73
MAN 4,26N=39 4,27N=53 4,18N=54 4,27N=48
EMP 3,94N=41 3,81N=36 3,75N=24 4,17N=22
IND 4,15N=32 4,08N=30 3,97N=29 4,26N=31
Note: The figures are logarithms of the ratio [Sales (in 1000 EEKs) /number of employees].
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TABLE 17.
Averages of investment per employees by ownership groups, (logs)
1994 1995 1996
Foreign 9,46N=16 9,66N=29 8,56N=25
ENT 8,13N=37 8 N=60 8,19N=43
MAN 8,73N=13 8,41N=39 7,74N=32
EMP 7,41N=26 7,74N=25 6,83N=11
IND 7,51N=18 7,44N=25 8,26N=18
Note: The figures are logarithms of the ratio [Sales (in EEKs) /number of
employees].
TABLE 18.
Percentage of firms belonging to the highest profit group, by largest
owner.
1994N 1995N 1996N 1997N
FOR 27,8N=36 36,8N=38 26,8N=41 34,2N=38
ENT 32,3N=65 41,9N=74 34,7N=72 26,7N=75
MAN 46,2N=39 39,6N=53 42,6N=54 43,8N=48
EMP 41,5N=41 33,3N=36 45,8N=24 54,6N=22
IND 56,3N=32 36,7N=30 37,9N=29 22,6N=31
